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Action-based decision making involves choices between different
physical actions to obtain rewards. To make such decisions the brain
needs to assign a value to each action and then compare them to
make a choice. Using fMRI in human subjects, we found evidence for
action-value signals in supplementary motor cortex. Separate brain
regions, most prominently ventromedial prefrontal cortex, were
involved in encoding the expected value of the action that was
ultimately taken. These findings differentiate two main forms of
value signals in the human brain: those relating to the value of each
available action, likely reflecting signals that are a precursor of choice,
and those corresponding to the expected value of the action that is
subsequently chosen, and therefore reflecting the consequence of the
decision process. Furthermore, we also found signals in the dorso-
medial frontal cortex that resemble the output of a decision compar-
ator, which implicates this region in the computation of the decision
itself.
acc  action value  reinforcement learning  sma  vmpfc
Consider a goalkeeper trying to stop a soccer ball during apenalty kick. Within a brief amount of time he needs to choose
between jumping to the left or right goal posts. Repeated play
against the same opponents allows him to learn about their scoring
tendencies, which can be used to compute the values of a left and
a right jump before making a decision. It is a long-established view
in economics, psychology, and computational neuroscience that the
brain makes choices among actions by first computing a value for
each possible action, and then selecting one of them on the basis of
those values (1–3). This raises two fundamental questions in
decision neuroscience: (1) where in the brain are the values of
different types of actions encoded? and (2) how and where does the
brain compare those values to generate a choice?
An emerging theme in decision neuroscience is that organisms
need to make a number of value-related computations to make
even simple choices (4). Consider the case of action-based choice
exemplified by the goalkeeper’s problem. First, he needs to assign
a value to each action under consideration. These signals, known as
action values, encode the value of each action before choice and
regardless of whether it is subsequently chosen or not, which allows
them to serve as inputs into the decision-making process (5–7).
Second, these action values are compared to generate a choice.
Third, the value of the option that is selected, known as the chosen
value, is tracked to be able to do reinforcement learning. In
particular, by comparing the value of the outcome generated by the
decision to the chosen value, the organism can compute a predic-
tion-error signal that can be used to update the action value of the
chosen option. Note that while the action values are computed
before the decision is made, the chosen value and outcome of the
comparator process signals are computed afterward.
Although a rapidly growing number of studies have found neural
responses that are correlated with some form of value signals, little
is known about how the brain encodes action values or about how
it compares them.This is central to understand how the brainmakes
action-based choices. For example, a number of chosen value
signals have been found in the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex
(8, 9) and amygdala (10, 11). Note that these signals are quite
distinct from action values, and are not precursors to choice,
because they reflect the value of the actions that were selected in
the decision. For similar reasons, the value signals that have been
found in lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) during saccadic action-
based choice (12, 13) are also not pure action values since they are
stronglymodulated bywhether an action is subsequently taken. This
suggests that instead of serving as inputs to the comparison process,
they reflect its output. Several studies found orbitofrontal cortex to
encode the value of different goals (14–16). Although these signals
are precursors of choice, they are not instances of action values since
they are stimulus-based and independent of the action required to
obtain them. To date, only three monkey electrophysiology studies
have found evidence for the presence of action-value signals for
hand and eye movements in the striatum during simple decision-
making tasks (5–7). This study extends their findings in three
directions. First, as of yet no evidence has been presented for the
existence of action-value signals in the human brain. Second, using
fMRIwe are able to look for action-value signals in the entire brain,
whereas the previous electrophysiology studies have limited their
attention to the striatum. As a result, no previous study has looked
for action-value signals in the cortex. This is important because, as
discussed below, there are a priori reasons to believe that action
value signalsmight be found in themotor and supplementarymotor
cortices. Finally, we investigate how such signalsmight be compared
to actually compute the decision itself and where neuronal corre-
lates of the output of this decision process are represented, an issue
about which very little is known.
We studied these questions using fMRI in humans while subjects
performed a variant of a two-armed bandit task to obtain proba-
bilistically delivered monetary rewards (Fig. 1A). A critical feature
of the task was that they had to select a motor response in one of
two distinct responsemodalities: in every trial, they could choose to
make either a saccade to the right of a fixation cross, or to press a
button with the right hand. This design allowed us to exploit the fact
that different regions of the cortex are involved in the planning of
eye and hand movements (17). We hypothesized that value repre-
sentations for the two actions would be separable within these
cortical areas at the spatial resolution available to fMRI. The
probability of being rewarded on each of the two actions drifted
randomly over time andwas independent of the probability of being
rewarded on the other (Fig. 1B). This characteristic ensured that
value estimates for eye and hand movements were uncorrelated,
which gave us maximum sensitivity with which to dissociate the
neural representations of the two action values.
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To look for neural correlates of action values we had to estimate
the value of taking each action in every trial. We calculated the
action values using a computational reinforcement-learning (RL)
model in which the value of each action, Veye and Vhand, was
updated in proportion to a prediction error on each trial (see Table
S1 for a summary of how the different types of value signals relate
to the components of the experiment). The model also assumed
that action selection in every trial followed a soft-max probability
rule based on the difference of the estimated action values (8). To
test for the presence of action value signals in the brain we took the
model predicted trial-by-trial estimates of the two action values and
entered these into a regression analysis against the fMRI data. In
addition to a whole brain screening for the presence of action-value
signals, we specifically looked for them in areas known to be
involved in the planning of motor actions, including supplementary
motor cortex (18–21) and lateral parietal cortex (22, 23). Given that
both of these areas have previously been shown to contain value-
related signals for movements in nonhuman primates, and that they
are closely interconnected with the area of motor cortex involved
in carrying out motor actions (24–26), we considered these areas
prime candidates for containing action-value representations that
could then be used to guide action-based choices. It is important to
emphasize, however, that the tasks used in previous studies did not
make it possible to determine if the value signals identified were
chosen values or action values.
We also looked for areas that are involved in comparing the
action values to make a choice. Two areas of a priori interest were
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the dorsal striatum. ACC
has been previously implicated in action-based choice, both in the
context of a human imaging study reporting activity in this area
during a task involving choices between different actions compared
to a situation involving responses guided by instruction (27), and in
a monkey lesion study where ACC lesions produced an impairment
in action-outcome based choice but not in mediating changes in
responses following errors (28). Dorsal striatum has been impli-
cated in both goal-directed and habitual instrumental responding
for reward in rodents (29, 30). Moreover, human fMRI studies
reveal increased activity in both of these regions when subjects
make choices to obtain reward compared to anotherwise analogous
situation in which the rewards are obtained without the need to
make a choice (31–34).
The most simple type of comparison process would be to
compute a difference between the two action values. We tested for
such a difference, but as we had no a priori hypothesis about the
directionality of the computation, we tested for both the difference
between the value of the action chosen and the value of action not
chosen (Vchosen  Vunchosen), and one involving the opposite
difference (Vunchosen Vchosen). As we found evidence for such an
action-value comparison signal in the brain, we then proposed a
simple computationalmodel to provide a conceptual explanation as
to how such a signal could reflect the output of a computationally
plausible decision mechanism.
Results
RL Model Fits to Behavioral Choice Data.A comparison of the choice
probabilities predicted by the RL model and the soft-max proce-
dure to subjects’ actual behavior suggests that the model matches
subjects behavior well. Fig. 1C compares both variables for a typical
subject. Fig. 1D compares the predicted choice probability (binned)
against the actual choice probabilities for the group.A similar linear
regression analysis at the individual level generated an average R2
across subjects of 0.83 and regression coefficients that were signif-
icant at P  0.001 in each subject.
Action Values. We found neural activity correlating with the action
values for making a hand movement in left supplementary motor
area (SMA; Fig. 2A and Table S2). A region of interest (ROI)
analysis showed that activity in this area satisfied the properties of
a hand action value: it was sensitive to the value of handmovements,
and it showed no response selectivity to the value of eyemovements
(Fig. 2B). Activity in lateral parietal cortex, ACC, and right dorsal
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Fig. 1. Experimental Design and Behavior. (A) Subjects were presented with a
choice cue after which they had to respond within 2.5 s by performing a saccade
to the red target circle or a right handed button press. Once a response was
registered the screen was immediately cleared for a short delay and subsequently
theoutcomewasrevealed(6safter trialonset) indicatingeither receiptof reward
or no reward. Inter-trial-intervals varied between 1 and 8 s. (B) Example reward
probabilities for saccades and button presses as a function of the trial number.
The probability of being rewarded following choice of either the hand or eye
movement was varied across the experiment independently for each movement.
(C) Fitted model choice probability (red) and actual choice behavior (blue) shown
for a single subject. (D) Actual choice behavior versus model predicted choice
probability. Data are pooled across subjects, the regression slope is shown as a
line, vertical bars, SEM.
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Fig. 2. Action values. (A) Region of supplementary motor area showing cor-
relations with action values for hand movement (Vh/green) and a region of
pre-SEF showing correlations with action-values for eye movements (Ve/red).
T-maps are shown from a whole brain analysis thresholded at P  0.001 uncor-
rected (see Fig. S1 for a version with color bars relating to t stats). (B) Average
effect sizes of Ve (red) and Vh (green) extracted from SEF and SMA. The effects
shownherewerecalculatedfromtrials independentof thoseusedtofunctionally
identify the ROI. Note that only Ve but not Vh modulate the signal in preSEF, and
that activity in SMA shows the opposite pattern. Vertical lines, SEM.
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putamen also correlated with hand action values. In contrast,
activity in a region of left supplementary motor cortex anterior to
the SMA (presupplementary eye fields, preSEF, Fig. 2A and Table
S2) correlated with action values for eyemovements. A similar ROI
analysis showed that the area satisfied the properties of an eye
action value: it was sensitive to the value of eye movements, but
showed no sensitivity to the value of handmovements (Fig. 2B).We
tested this by performing a two-way ANOVA with the factors of
area (SEF vs. SMA) and action value (eye vs. hand). There was no
significant main effect for either area or action value but the
interaction was significant at P  0.03 (F  5.6, df  1). Another
important feature of an action value signal is that, since it is a
precursor of choice, it should not depend on which action is actually
chosen.We tested for this property by computing the following two
voxel-wise interaction contrasts (Veeye  Vehand)  0 and
(Vhhand  Vheye)  0. We found no significant interaction
between action value and chosen action in either SMA or preSEF
at P  0.05 uncorrected. A post-hoc plot of the average percent
signal change within each cluster plotted as a function of high and
low action values are shown in Fig. S2.
One potential explanation for these correlations is that activity in
the SEF and SMA reflect motor preparation. To help exclude the
possibility, we carried out two additional analyses. First, we esti-
mated a model that used reaction times (RT) as a proxy index of
the degree ofmotor preparation on a given trial and foundhand and
eye RTs did not show the same pattern of differential correlations
in SMA and SEF as exhibited by our action-value regressors.
Second, we estimated a version of our main general linear model in
which the RTs were included as a covariate of no interest alongside
our action-value signals, and found the action-value results in SMA
and SEF still survived at P  0.005 uncorrected. Both results
suggest that simple motor preparation is unlikely to account for the
correlations with action values identified above.
Another alternative potential explanation for the correlations
between activity in SMA/pre-SEF and action values is that signal
fluctuations in these areas depend on the degree to which subjects
currently choose those motor actions. For example when the value
of a hand movement is high, the subject may tend to choose hand
actionsmore often, and therefore activity in SMAmay be increased
as a result of enhanced overall motor excitability. We tested for this
possible confound by regressing BOLD signals against the degree
to which subjects’ favored one or other action in the recent past.We
found activation most prominently within the occipital lobe, pri-
mary motor cortex, cerebellum, and dorsal medial frontal gyrus.
However, we did not find any significant correlation within our
previously identified action value areas, ruling out this possible
explanation for the action-value signals in SMA, SEF, and else-
where (see Table S2 and Fig. S3).
Chosen Values. We then looked for correlates of the value of the
action that is chosen on a particular trial, irrespective of itsmodality.
Consistent with previous findings (8, 9), we found chosen value
modulated activity in a number of brain areas,most prominently the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) extending onto themedial
orbital surface (Fig. 3A and Table S2). The parietal cortex, includ-
ing bilateral IPS and right LIP were also activated by this contrast.
We also tested for areas correlating with the chosen value only
on occasions when the action chosenwas a handmovement, and for
areas correlating with chosen value only on trials in which the eye
movement was chosen. Intriguingly, we found evidence for a
topographical arrangement of action specific chosen value signals in
vmPFC along the anterior-posterior axis, whereby a mid-vmPFC
region correlated with hand values only when hand movements
were selected, and a region of more posterior vmPFC correlated
with the value of eyemovements only on trials when eyemovements
were selected. These two action specific representations were both
located caudal to the value chosen signal reported above (Fig. 3B).
Action-Value Comparison: Decision Computation. The most straight-
forward decision process to compare the action values is to compute
the value difference and choose the one with the higher value. We
looked for areas in which BOLD activity was correlated with the
value difference between the two action values. As any difference
in values can be computed by subtracting the lower from the higher
value and also by subtracting the higher value from the lower value,
and we had no a priori hypothesis for the directionality of the
computation, we tested for correlates of both. We did not find any
areas where activity was correlated with Vchosen  Vunchosen at our
omnibus statistical threshold of P  0.001 uncorrected. However,
we found a strong correlation with Vunchosen  Vchosen in anterior
cingulate cortex, extending dorsally into Brodmann area 9 (dmFC;
Fig. 4A and Table S2).
To provide a conceptual explanation as to how the brain might
implement the value difference computation, we constructed a
computational model called the competition difference model
(CDM). (Fig. S4). Thismodel is a simple neural network that carries
out value comparisons by stochastic mutual inhibition between two
populations of neurons: one encoding the value of a hand move-
ment, and one encoding the value of an eye movement. The model
takes into account the stochasticity that leads to non-optimal
choices in a proportion of the trials, consistent with actual behavior
choices. It produces an output that closely resembles but is not
identical to, the value comparison regressor used above. To validate
the model behaviorally, we compared the performance of the
model on subjects’ actual choice behavior and found that themodel
predicted subjects’ actual choices as well as the soft-max procedure
used with reinforcement learning (Table S3). We then used the
output of this model as a parametric regressor in our fMRI analysis
instead of the value difference. This model was found to correlate
robustly with activity in the same anterior cingulate cortex region
identified as correlating with the value difference (Fig. 4B). Thus,
the model proposed here provides a possible description of the
Fig. 3. Chosen values. (A) Brain regions showing significant correlations with
the value of the action chosen. Areas shown include vmPFC, intra-parietal sulcus
and posterior cingulate cortex. Threshold is set at P 0.001. (B) Distinct forms of
the value chosen signal are present within vmPFC. The area depicted in yellow
indicates voxels that correlate with the value of the chosen action irrespective of
whether the action taken is a hand or an eye movement. The area depicted in
green correlates only with the value chosen on trials when the hand movement
is chosen but not when the eye movement is chosen. Finally the area depicted in
red indicates voxels correlating with value chosen only on trials when the eye
movement is selected but not the hand movement. The results suggest an
anterior to posterior trend in the selectivity of voxels to these different types of
value chosen signals. Bar plots show effect sizes averaged across subjects for the
actionspecificvaluechosensignals inthethreeareas (left: redarea,middle:green
area, right: yellow area). Bars shown in chromatic color are significantly different
from zero (t test, P 0.05). Similar to bar plots in Fig. 2B, effects were calculated
from a data sample independent of the one used to functionally identify the ROI.
Vertical lines, SEM.
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output of a decision comparator, and captures activity related to
such a comparison process in ACC.
An important question is the relationship between our suggested
role for dmFC/ACC in the decision comparison process and prior
findings implicating this area in error monitoring (35). An error-
monitoring signal would be strongest on trials where subjects chose
the lower valued action and in which there is a large difference
between the values of the two available actions (as on those trials
it should be most clear to the subjects that they have erroneously
chosen the ‘‘wrong’’ action). However, we still find significant
correlations between the dmFC signal andour decisionmodelwhen
we restrict the analysis to trials in which the value of the chosen
action largely exceeded the value of the unchosen action (Fig. 4C).
Another possibility is that subjects were deliberately choosing the
lower value action in some trials to explore and anticipated in those
deliberate ‘error’ trials a negative outcome. We therefore also
looked for regions that had stronger activity during the choice
period on trials that were subsequently not rewarded compared to
subsequently rewarded trials. Activity in the frontal poles showed
such a pattern but not activity in dmFC/rostral ACC. Together this
suggests that the decision signal is unlikely to be accounted solely
as a side effect of error monitoring.
Another pertinent issue is the extent to which the activity in
dmFC/ACC is related to conflict monitoring, another cognitive
function that has been attributed to this area (36). To compare these
explanations we constructed a measure of decision conflict by
testing for areas showing amaximal responsewhen the action values
are the same, and a minimal response when they are maximally
different. We found that activity in rostral dmFC is significantly
better explained by the decision signal than by this simple decision
conflict signal (Fig. 4D), and this is true even if the measure of
decision conflict includes subject specific biases to either eye or
hand movements. To further address this point, we also tested for
correlations of reaction time with decision difficulty, but did not
observe any such influences (r  0.01 across all subjects).
Discussion
Action based decision-making involves different kinds of value
signals that play specific roles in the various stages of the decision
process (Fig. 4E). Action values are by definition precursors of
choice that are used to guide the decision process. Here we provide
evidence that action-values for different physical actions are present
in the supplementary motor area. These value signals are not
modulated by choice, that is, they are present for a given action on
trials when that action is chosen and on trials when that action is not
chosen. We found neural correlates for action values in supple-
mentary motor cortex, an area traditionally associated with motor
planning (37). This finding supports the hypothesis that during
decisions involving motor actions, action-value signals are encoded
in brain regions directly connected with, and involved in, the
generation of motor output (38). This finding is broadly consistent
with a number of previous studies that have investigated the role of
the motor system in decision making. For example, two studies (25,
26) have found monkey medial premotor cortex involved in the
entire discrimination process between haptic stimuli, and the find-
ings of another study (24) suggest that formation of the decision and
formation of the behavioral response share a common level of
neural organization.
In contrast to the supplementary motor cortex, activity in both
the vmPFC and intraparietal sulcus pertained predominantly to the
value of the action that is chosen. Such signals are a consequence
of the decision process, emerging after the subject has decided
which actionwill ultimately be taken.We suggest that the functional
contribution of such signals to the decision process is likely not in
guiding choice directly, but rather in learning the action values.
Reinforcement learning theory stipulates that updating of action
values occurs via a prediction error, which computes the difference
between actual and expected outcomes (2, 39, 40).Amajor function
of the chosen value signals in these areas could be to facilitate the
generation of a prediction error signal that can then be used to
update future action values. It is notable that the two signals
required to compute a prediction error, namely the actual outcome
and the expected outcome (of the chosen action) are both repre-
sented in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (8, 9, 41, 42). Therefore
this region is ideally placed to facilitate computation of the pre-
diction error signal that could then be transferred on to dopami-
nergic neurons in the midbrain for subsequent broadcast (43, 44).
Another intriguing feature of our results is that we observed a
number of different types of chosen value signals within vmPFC.
While one region of vmPFC was responsive to the value of the
chosen action irrespective of whether that action was a hand or an
eye, distinct regions more posterior within vmPFC appear to be
sensitive to action specific chosen values. These findings provide
evidence that values of different types of movement might be
represented separatelywithin vmPFC, adding further support to the
suggestion that this region plays a role in encoding the value of
chosen actions as well as possibly contributing to encoding stimulus-
values (45). The apparent topographical arrangement of action
modality specific value signals within vmPFC may relate to distinct
cortico-striatal loops concerned with processing hand and eye
movements (46).
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Fig. 4. Value comparison. (A) Region of dmFC and adjacent ACC showing
significant correlations with the Vunchosen  Vchosen value difference contrast.
Additional areas correlating with this comparison signal are bilateral anterior
insula and left dlFC. (B) Output of our stochastic decision model for the value
comparison showing correlations with activity in the same brain regions. (C)
The model explains activity in dmFC even on a subset of trials where subjects
clearly choose the ‘‘correct’’ and not ‘‘erroneous’’ choice (where Vchosen 
Vunchosen0.2). This suggests that the result in (B) cannot be fully explained
by error monitoring. (D) Average beta values in the random effects analysis of
the model described in the text showing that neural activity in dmFC/ACC is
explained better by the output of our decision model than by a decision
difficulty based index of decision conflict (P  107). The vertical lines, the
SEM. (E) Illustration of the different stages involved in action based decision-
making: action-based decision-making requires the computation of distinct
value representations for both choice alternatives (purple box). These action
values are compared against each other in a decision comparator (yellow box)
to decide on a particular action. Such a comparator could yield a signal that
approximately resembles the difference in the action values of the two
actions. The output from this comparator could then be passed through a
nonlinear function to inhibit a response of the unchosen action in primary
motor areas (green box). The value of the chosen action is used to update
future action values on the basis of experience, and to generate prediction
errors (red box).
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Our results also suggest that the dmFC/ACC plays a role in the
decision process. Interestingly, this area has been previously impli-
cated in action-based choice: in the context of a human neuroim-
aging study reporting activity in this area during a task involving
choices between different actions compared to a situation involving
responses guided by instruction (27) and single neuron recordings
have shown that cells in this area were activated only by particular
action-reward combinations (47). Another study suggests that this
region plays a part in processing the reward information for motor
selection (48). Consistent with our findings, Seo and Lee (22) found
neural signals resembling the difference between action values in
this region. In addition, ACC lesions have been shown to produce
an impairment in action outcome-based choice, but not in medi-
ating changes in responses following errors (28, 49). Our results
provide evidence that these deficits might be the results of impair-
ments in themechanisms in ACC/dmFC responsible for comparing
action values. Heekeren et al. (50, 51) [see also (52)] have used
fMRI to look for regions that might be involved in computing
perceptual decisions. They found evidence that activity in left
dorso-lateral PFC encodes a value signal that is proportional to the
absolute value difference between the two signals, while our value
difference related signal is represented in dorso-medial PFC. The
specific form of the comparison signal we found in ACC was well
captured by a simple network model that we called the CDM. This
model relies on a mutual inhibitory competition between distinct
populations of neurons representing eye and hand movements to
generate a decision. Although it bears a conceptual relationship to
many other models used to generate decisions such as the drift
diffusion model (DDM) (Fig. S5) (53–55), the predictions of the
CDM and the DDM model are in fact very different (see SI Text
for more details). Indeed, while the CDM model provides a good
account for the comparison signal we observed in ACC, the DDM
model fails to capture such an output. Because our study was not
designed to address the presence ofDDM-related signals we cannot
rule out the contribution of such computations to the decision
process. However, it is worth noting that while there is now
considerable evidence concerning the applicability of the DDM
model to the neural mechanisms underlying decision making in the
perceptual domain (56, 57), to our knowledge very little evidence
exists regarding the applicability of such a model to value-based
decision making. Thus, it is possible that these two different types
of decisions rely on distinct computational processes.
Interestingly, the signal reflecting the output of the action-value
comparator represented the difference between the action not
chosen and the action chosen, instead of the more intuitive differ-
ence given by the action chosen minus the action not chosen. A
speculative interpretation for this finding is that the outcome of the
comparator process is used to inhibit the opposite action, instead of
exciting the motor plan that it represents. Interestingly, our activa-
tion pattern looks very similar to one found in a study of volitional
motor inhibition (58). Such a mechanism based on preinnervation
and inhibition could provide a better execution speed after the
values become available compared to a mechanism where the
motor response is planned only after the decision has been made.
Although we cannot distinguish between excitatory and inhibitory
processes based on the measured BOLD (59), our hypothesis
resonates with previous findings that preinnervation and inhibition
play an important role in motor execution and volitional action
initiation (60, 61).
Since activity in ACC/dmFC has been associated with error
monitoring and conflict detection in previous studies we carried out
several controls to help exclude the possibility that the activity we
observed in this area can be explained by these alternative com-
putations. We emphasize that our results don’t rule out a contri-
bution of ACC to either conflict or error monitoring, but rather
suggest that these explanations are unlikely to account fully for the
results we observe here. Instead we provide a mechanistic account
for how action comparison signals in ACC/dmFC could form an
integrated part of the decision process. Note that because of
limitations in the spatial and temporal resolution of our fMRI signal
it is not possible to determine whether the signal we observe
reflects solely the output of a decision comparator or whether
the dmFC/ACC is involved in the comparison process itself.
Therefore the possibility exists that the actual computation of
the decision is carried out elsewhere and the output then
transferred to dmFC/ACC.
Choices between different physical actions, such as those studied
here, represent a large subset of the decisions made by humans and
other animals. The present study has identified neural mechanisms
involved in these types of choices and provides insight into the
general neural mechanism that might be involved in action-based
decision making. An important question for future studies is
whether similar mechanisms are at play when goal-directed deci-
sions are made between more abstract choices not tied to specific
physical actions.
Methods
Subjects. Twenty-three healthy subjects [10 female; 18–29 years old; right-
handed, assessed by self-report with an adapted version of the Edinburgh hand-
edness inventory (62)] with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness par-
ticipated in the study. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
of the California Institute of Technology.
Experimental Design and Task. The task is a variant of a two-armed bandit
problem in which subjects chose between two actions: a button press with the
right index finger, and a saccade from a central fixation cross to a target located
at10°ofvisualangle intherighthemifield. Ineverytrialeachactionyieldedeither
a prize of 10 cents, or nothing. We did not reveal the exact reward per trial to
subjectsbeforetheexperimentbut insteadinstructedthemonlythattheywillget
a small amount of money for each rewarded trial. At the end of the experiment,
subjectswerepaidtheiraccumulatedearnings inadditiontoaflatamountof$25.
The probability (Qi,t) of action i being rewarded in trial t evolved over time as
adecayingGaussianrandomwalkprocess,withQi,t 1max{0,min[1,Qi,t (1
) ]}; where the decay parameter was 0.79836, the decay center was 0.50,
and the diffusion noise  was zero-mean Gaussian with standard deviation d
0.208. Five different probability trajectories were generated using this method
and were assigned across subjects randomly. The task consisted of two sessions of
150 trials separated by a short break. There were three trial types. In free-choice
trials (150 trials) the subject had to choose one of the two actions and both were
rewarded according to their current reward schedule. Free-choice trials were
pseudorandomly interspersed with forced-choice trials (50 eye trials and 50 hand
trials) and null-choice trials (50 trials). Subjects were instructed that in forced trials
only the displayed action would be rewarded with its current probability, while
the other action would lead to a zero prize with certainty. Subjects did not get a
prize in null-trials, but were still required to make a choice.
The task was presented via back projection on a translucent screen, viewable
through a headcoil mounted mirror. Subjects chose the hand action by pressing
a button on a button box with their right index finger. Eye positions were
monitored at 120 Hz with a long-range infrared eye-tracking device (ASL Model
L6 with control unit ASL 6000, Applied Science Laboratories). An eye action
during the choice period was registered when the median horizontal eye coor-
dinate during the past 200 ms exceeded 8° of visual angle to the right from
fixation. Subjects were instructed to maintain fixation during the entire experi-
ment when not deliberately making a saccade.
Reinforcement Learning (RL) Model. A RL model was used to estimate the value
that the brain assigned to the two actions on the basis of trial-by-trial experience.
In this study we used a version of RL called Q-learning, where action values are
updated using a simple Rescorla-Wagner rule (see SI Text for details).
Computational Model of the Choice Process (Decision Model). We were also
interested in identifying brain regions involved in comparing the action values to
make decisions. The most basic value comparison process that one could consider
involves calculating the difference between the action values to identify and
select the largest one. A problem with such a model is that it does not account for
the choice stochasticity that is observed in the data, and thus it cannot explain
behavior in those trials where subjects chose the action with the lower action
value. We therefore constructed an extremely simple neural network type model
that characterizes the properties of aggregate activity that identify putative
decision making regions (Fig. S6). We then use these trial-by-trial predictions as
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parametric regressors in our fMRI analysis to identify areas where the value
comparison computation might be carried out (see SI Text for details).
FMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis. Data were acquired with a 3T scanner (Trio,
Siemens) using an eight-channel phased array head coil (see SI Text for details).
We estimated two different general linear models with AR (1) for each
individual subject (see the SI Text for details). In each case we computed contrasts
of interest at the individual level using linear combinations of the regressors and,
toenable inferenceatthegrouplevel,wecalculatedsecond-levelgroupcontrasts
using a one-sample t test.
Whole brain inference was carried out at P  0.001 uncorrected. We also
computed small volume correction (SVC) for multiple comparisons at theP0.05
level in areas or a priori interest (SI Text).
ThestructuralT1 imageswereco-registeredtothemeanfunctionalEPI images
for each subject and normalized using the parameters derived from the EPI
images. Anatomical localization was carried out by overlaying the t-maps on a
normalized structural image averaged across subjects, and with reference to an
anatomical atlas (63).
To ensure the independence of the effect size analysis in Figs. 2 and 3 we
randomly divided the data into two halves: the first half was used to define an
ROI, the second half was used to measure the effect sizes (see the SI Text for
details).
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